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Abstract—As demand on data access and bandwidth explodes,
service providers across cellular network infrastructures are
struggling to find effective ways to manage the data traffic on
their network, and meet customer expectations without eroding
profitability, or attracting regulatory attention. Pricing schemes
are designed to offer protable business to the operators as well
as to create favorable services for the mobile subscribers. In this
paper, we analyze three well-known pricing schemes proposed for
Long Term Evolution (LTE) mobile networks. We then propose a
realistic per-category pricing (R2P) scheme for LTE. Our pricing
scheme takes into account QoS parameters, physical resources
blocs utilization, user valuation, and user price categories: Gold,
Silver and Bronze. Finally, we show, through extensive simulation
results that our proposed pricing scheme provides the higher
revenue for the operator.
I. INTRODUCTION
Long Term Evolution (LTE) defined by third Generation
Partnership Project (3GPP) Realease 8 in 2008 is a very
promising technology providing a high peak data rate of 163
Mbps in a channel bandwidth of 10 MHz and a low latency
of 15 ms [1]. The enhancement of LTE, called LTE-Advanced
(LTE-A), aims to reach a peak data rate of 1 Gbps in order to
have a fourth generation (4G) access technology. This technol-
ogy continues to evolve through Release 12 which is planned
be completed in June 2014 [2]. This release includes advanced
features such as Local Area Access (LAA) enhancement and
direct device-to-device communication improvement [5].
Many kinds of applications can be simultaneously per-
formed in an LTE User Equipment (UE) and each of them
has its own requirements. For example, a Voice over Internet
Protocol (VoIP) application has a strict delay and jitter require-
ments [3] comparing with a web browser application. However,
a web application requires a very low packet loss ratio [4].
Therefore, LTE defines different QoS classes specifying their
QoS Class Identifier (QCI), resources type, priority as well
as delay and loss ratio thresholds. The nine standardized QCI
characteristics are presented in Table 6.1.7. of [6]. Only the
resource type of the first fourth QCIs is of the Guaranteed
Bit Rate (GBR) type. GBR means that a minimum of bit rate
resources has to be reserved. The last five QCIs resource type
is the Non-GBR type.
The standard also defines user charging requirements in
[7] as the charging principles for user session components and
roaming. For example, real time audio and video are charged
by duration of session and QoS requested and/or delivered
while messaging (SMS text type) is charged by event and
volume of data.
In spite of the description of the QoS classes and the
charging requirements, 3GPP does not specify the policing
mechanism to be used. To the best of our knowledge, contrary
to the technical aspects that were received numerous studies
like scheduling, the economic aspects of radio resources have
received little attention. In this paper, we study pricing in LTE.
In [8], a pricing scheme, called Fixed PRB Pricing (FPP),
is proposed. For each users category, a fixed price is charged.
This pricing scheme can be adapted to LTE. In fact, three
kinds of LTE users are defined: Gold, Silver, and Bronze.
Then, a fixed price per Physical Resource Block (PRB), which
represents the resource allocation unit in LTE, is charged (see
Equation (1)).
P (i) = Pfixed(Cat(i))NPRB(i) (1)
where Cat(i) represents the category of user i, Pfixed repre-
sents a fixed price that depends on the category of the user
and NPRB(i) represents of the number of PRBs allocated for
this user i.
In [9], scheme Network Load based Pricing (NLP) for
3G/4G multimedia service pricing is presented. The basic idea
of this scheme is to charge users with a high price when the
network load becomes very important (exceeding a defined
threshold). Note that this scheme were adapted to LTE network
in [10] by replacing the traffic load factor (LT F ) by the
proportion between assigned PRBs and the total number of
PRBs. The price to pay is computed as follows:
P (i; j) = Fij  (e  e bx) LT F (2)
where:
 Fij : is a price factor for user i that has category j. It
is constant and the same for each category when the
traffic load does not exceed defined threshold TH (fc).
Otherwise, this factor becomes variable and depends
on the users category (fj).
 b: is a linearity parameter used in order to restrict the
price between defined minimum and maximum price
values.
 x: represents a QoS attribute that depends on the user
QCI. When the QCI increases, x decreases to charge
higher price for sophisticated users. For example,
when the QCI is equal to 1, x is equal to 9 and when
the QCI becomes equal to 3, x becomes equal to 7 and
then the price paid by QCI 1 represents the highest
price (e  e 9b is the highest value).
 LT F : represents the traffic load factor.
A pricing scheme for LTE, called Subscriber Class based
Pricing (SCP), is presented in [10]. This price fixed by the
operator depends on the user type (Gold, Silver and Bronze)
and the traffic conditions. Gold, Silver, and Bronze users are
charged using (3), (4), (5), respectively.
P (G) =

Pfixed(G) PRB; if nass(G)ntot  THG
(Pfixed(G) + Padd) PRB; otherwise (3)
P (S) =

Pfixed(S) PRB; if nass(S)ntot  THS
(2 Pfixed(G) + Padd) PRB; otherwise
(4)
P (B) =

Pfixed(B) PRB; if nass(B)ntot  THB
(2 Pfixed(G) + Pfixed(S) + Padd) PRB; o.
(5)
where Pfixed represents a fixed price depending on the user
type, PRB represents the number of allocated PRBs, TH rep-
resents a defined threshold pointing out the congestion and is
compared with the fraction between the assigned PRBs (nass)
and the total number of PRBs (ntot), and Padd represents an
additional price paid when a congestion happens. Padd is equal
to constant factor K divided by the number of the allocated
PRBs.
Note that FPP does not take into account network con-
gestion while NLP defines the same price to pay between
all users when there is no congestion. In fact, each user has
its willingness-to-pay (called user valuation). Moreover, the
threshold that defines congestion periods is shared between
all categories and therefore Bronze users, for example, can
overload the network and then block Gold users because of
the high price. In this case, the operator cannot profit from
the high valuation of Gold users. Finally, SCP defines a very
high additional price without considering that each user has its
own valuation function. This function defines the price willing
to pay. So, when the price requested by the operator becomes
very high, the client prefers to delay/cancel his connection to
the network.
In this paper, we propose a realistic per-category pricing
(R2P) scheme that takes into account the user valuation, the
LTE allocation unit (PRB), and the QoS classes. Moreover,
it is interesting to increase the price to paid when resources
become scarce and in general operators aim to take advantage
of willingness-to-pay of users.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present
the system model. Then, we describe our pricing models for
Gold, Bronze, and Silver users in Section III. In Section IV,
we present some simulation results for our pricing scheme.
Conclusions and directions for future work are provided in
Section V.
TABLE I. CHANNEL QUALITY AND NUMBER OF BITS TRANSMITTED
PER PRB FOR VARIOUS MCSS.
MCS SINR interval (dB) Number of bits transmitted per PRB
QPSK 1/2 [2.9, 6.3[ 7  12  2  12 = 84
QPSK 3/4 [6.3, 8.6[ 7  12  2  34 = 126
16QAM 1/2 [8.6, 12.7[ 7  12  4  12 = 168
64QAM 3/4 [12.7, 16.9[ 7  12  4  34 = 252
64QAM 2/3 [16.9, 18[ 7  12  6  23 = 336
64QAM 3/4 [18, 1[ 7  12  6  34 = 378
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In our system model, we consider the downlink direction
in the LTE network. The LTE downlink frame duration is 10
ms and the sub-frame duration is 1 ms (so there are 10 sub-
frames for each downlink frame). Each sub-frame consists of
two slots. Each slot consists of seven (respectively six) OFDM
symbols when the normal (respectively extended) Cyclic Prefix
(CP) is used. In the frequency domain, each resource contains
12 sub-carriers occupying a frequency of 180 kHz. In this
paper, we consider a normal CP and therefore each resource
block contains 84 (7 12) resource elements.
A. User SINR and MCS
In this paper, we consider a link adaptation mechanism that
selects the Modulation and Coding Scheme used depending
on the Signal-to-Interference plus Noise Ratio (SINR) of the
user channel (see Table I). The SINR intervals are defined
in [11]. Note that when the channel condition is better, the
MCS used is more efficient and then the number of useful
transmitted bits per PRB increases. For example, MCS 64-
QAM that represents the most efficient MCS allows station to
send 378 bits per PRB when the channel state is very good
(the SINR is greater than 18 dB). The MCS selection is done
by the evolved NodeB (eNodeB) basing on channel quality
information. The eNodeB is an LTE entity which is responsible
for radio transmission and reception with UEs. The evaluation
of channel conditions is based on the estimated SINR of the
user channel. For each PRB, effective SINR (SINReff ) is
used as a metric to evaluate the channel quality information of
this PRB. The SINR value of a defined sub-carrier is computed
as follows:
SINRn =
P sn
N0 Wsc +
P
i 6=s P in
(6)
where n represents the index of the sub-carrier, P s repre-
sents the received power of the serving eNodeB, N0 represents
the noise density, and Wsc represents the frequency spacing.
B. User categories
In this paper, we consider three categories (Gold, Silver,
and Bronze) as defined in [12]. All QCIs are available for a
Gold user and therefore he can use all network services such as
real-time gaming and High Definition (HD) video. For a Silver
user, only QCIs 3 and 5 are forbidden to use. Finally, a Bronze
user is limited to use only Non-GBR services except QCI 5.
The authorized QCIs and services of each users category are
presented in Table II.
TABLE II. CHARACTERISTICS OF USERS CATEGORIES.
User category Authorized QCIs Examples of services
Gold 1 - 9 IMS signaling, Conversational voice, Real-time gaming and HD video, Live video, Buffered video, Interactive gaming, TCP and P2P, etc.
Silver 1, 2, 4, 6 - 9 All above except IMS signaling, real-time gaming and HD video
Bronze 6 - 9 Buffered video, interactive gaming, TCP and P2P
C. Scheduling
Scheduling is responsible for distributing available re-
sources among active users in order to satisfy their QoS
needs and effectively allocate radio resources in both time and
frequency domains (TD and FD, respectively). In LTE, the
TD scheduler is used to differentiate between users according
to their categories. The user having higher priority is served
first (the scheduler serves Gold, then Silver and finally Bronze
users). When the TD scheduler selects a user to serve, the
FD scheduler determines the best PRBs to allocate in the
frequency axis. In fact, the SINRs of PRBs are variable as
different frequencies are used. Therefore, the FD scheduler is
responsible for selecting the most efficient PRBs in one slot.
D. Valuation function of the user
We now introduce the valuation functions that we propose
for each users category. The estimation of the real willingness-
to-pay of users is quite difficult and would need deep per-
formance evaluation, such as in [13] for wired services. In
the following we choose to take well known and often used
valuation functions which represent price-related demands as
in [14] and [15]. We consider that each user i is willing to pay
a given price i per transmitted rate ri. Formally:
V (ri) = i  ri: (7)
Each user i has its own i. To evaluate our pricing
scheme, we assume that i is randomly chosen according
to a uniform random distribution on the continuous interval
[ G1 , 
G
2 ], [ 
S
1 , 
S
2 ], and [ 
B
1 , 
B
2 ]), respectively for Gold, Silver
and Bronze categories. If the price being to charge to the user
is higher than its valuation, the resource allocation is rejected.
E. Operators revenue
The network operator affects the allocation of resources
through pricing, and users react to these prices. The index of
user i belongs to [1::N ]. The income of the operator is the
sum of the prices paid by all users:
Revenue =
X
i=1::N
Pi: (8)
III. PROPOSED PRICING MODELS: R2P
We propose a dynamic pricing scheme for each users
category (Gold, Silver or Bronze). Gold and Silver users
are charged a fixed price per each PRB allocated in the
non-congestion situation (the price unit is monetary unit per
PRB: mu/PRB). An additional price will be charged when a
congestion happens as radio resources become very scarce.
The additional price of both categories increases when the
remaining PRBs decreases. Moreover, the additional price
for Gold users depends on the type of service (QoS). The
higher quality of service is, the higher additional price is paid.
Note that Gold and Silver users may have GBR or Non-GBR
services.
As the Bronze users are restricted to Non-GBR services,
we choose that this users category is charged a price that
does not depend on the traffic conditions. Recall that this
kind of services does not guarantee any minimum reserved
rate. Moreover, the unit of this price is mu per rate reserved.
However, as allocation unit is the PRB and the number of
bits transmitted per PRB depends on the MCS used (see Table
I), we have to take into account the channel condition of the
users when defining the price to paid. The lower MCS used,
the higher is the price to charge. Indeed, when the MCS is
not efficient (for example QPSK 1/2), only 84 bits can be
transmitted per PRB and therefore the transmission of the same
quantity of information needs more PRBs than a more efficient
MCS.
A. Pricing model for Gold user
Each Gold user i is charged P (G; i) computed as follows:
P (G; i) =

Pfixed(G) nPRB(i); if nass(G)ntot  THG
(Pfixed(G) + Padd(G)) nPRB(i); otherwise
(9)
where:
 Pfixed(G): represents a fixed price per PRB allocated
and this price is paid when there is no congestion.
 nPRB(i): represents the number of PRBs to allocate
to user i.
 nass(G): represents the number of PRBs already
assigned in one slot for Gold users.
 ntot: represents the total number of PRBs in one slot.
This number depends on the bandwidth used in the
LTE system. For example, in a bandwidth of 20 MHz,
ntot is equal to 100.
 THG: represents a defined threshold specifying the
congestion periods for Gold users.
 Padd(G): represents an additional price per PRB paid
when the network is overloaded. It depends on the
QoS class and the traffic condition (see (10)).
Padd(G) =
exp+
1
x
remPRB
(10)
where:
 x: represents the QCI of the user. Its value is between
1 and 9. Higher QCIs for Non-GBR services are
charged lower price. For example, when the QCI is
equal to 9, the extra price will be exp
+1
9
remPRB
and this
price is lower than that paid by a user having a QCI
equal to 3 ( exp
+1
3
remPRB
).
 : represents a constant coefficient. It allows the
operator to adjust the additional price to paid.
 remPRB : represents the number of remaining PRBs
(remPRB = ntot nass(G) as Gold users are served
in the first step).
B. Pricing model for Silver user
Each Silver user i is charged P (S; i) computed as follows:
P (S; i) =

Pfixed(S) nPRB(i); if nass(S)ntot  THS
(Pfixed(S) + Padd(S)) nPRB(i); otherwise
(11)
The additional price defined for a Silver user is computed
as follows:
Padd(S) =
K
remPRB
(12)
where K is a constant factor and remPRB is the remaining
PRBs after serving Gold and Silver users.
C. Pricing model for Bronze user
Bronze user i is charged P (B; i) computed as follows:
P (B; i) = Pfixed(B) r(i) NBPmax
NBPi
(13)
Where:
 r(i): represents the transmitted rate delivered to user
i.
 NBPmax: represents the highest number of bits trans-
mitted per one PRB (when the most efficient MCS is
used, see Table I).
 NBPi: represents the current number of bits transmit-
ted per one PRB (for the current MCS used by user
i).
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present the simulation results in order to
evaluate the performance of our proposed pricing model: R2P.
R2P is compared with various pricing schemes: FPP, NLP, and
SCP. First we present our simulation model. Then we present
simulation results showing how optimal revenues are obtained
from R2P. The same approach is followed for other existing
pricing schemes in order to maximize the operator revenue.
Finally we compare between different LTE pricing schemes.
TABLE III. MAIN SIMULATION PARAMETERS.
Parameters Values
Bandwidth 20 MHz
Total number of sub-carriers used
per slot
1200
Number of sub-carriers per PRB 12
Number of PRB available per slot 100
Sub-carriers spacing 15 kHz
Frame duration 10 ms
Cellular layout 1 cell
Call radius 1500 m
Height of eNodeB antenna 32 m
Path loss model Cost HATA 231
Shadow fading Log-normal Standard deviation (8 dB)
Fast fading Rayleigh Distribution
Total eNodeB Transmission Power 46 dBm
Thermal noise density -174 dBm/Hz
Number of users 900
Positions of users Random
MCSs of users Selecting using link adaption
Categories of users Probability of 1/3 for each category
QCIs of users Random between allowed QCIs
Rate requested GBR: 100 Kbit/s, Non-GBR: 50 Kbit/s
Valuations of users Uniform
Resource allocation Per slot
A. Simulation model
We consider a system-level simulation model based on
one hexagonal cell having a radius of 1500 m. In this cell,
there are 900 users. Through extensive simulations, we show
that this number can congest the network. Even for lower
numbers of users in the LTE system, our proposed scheme
outperforms FPP, NLP and SCP. The user category, SINR,
traffic characteristics, and valuation of each user are uniformly
distributed.
Table III summarizes the main parameters of the system-
level simulator we use. For example, the bandwidth used is 20
Mhz and therefore there are 100 PRBs per slot. The number
of sub-carriers per PRB is 12. Users categories are distributed
uniformly between Gold, Silver and Bronze. Then, a QCI is
chosen between the allowed values (see Table II). The rate
requested for each user depends on the service type. Recall
that a Gold/Silver user can use resource types GBR or Non-
GBR while a Bronze user is restricted to Non-GBR and then
all Bronze users request a rate of 50 Kbit/s. The valuation
of each user is chosen in manner that at least a user having
the most efficient MCS (64QAM 3/4) can pay requested price
when there is no congestion. Finally, the scheduling decision
in LTE is done each slot or each sub-frame (two slots). We
select the first option.
B. Revenue maximization
In this section, we present simulation results when varying
Pfixed(G), Pfixed(S), and THS . Note that we have investi-
gated all parameters of our proposed pricing scheme as well
as of FPP, NLP, and SCP. All optimal values are presented in
Table IV.
Figure 1 represents the operator revenue from Gold, Silver,
and Bronze users as a function of Pfixed(G). Note that
when the price requested by the operator is high, the revenue
increases while the users accept the price to charge. However, a
very high price increases the blocking rate (the rate of users re-
fusing to pay) and therefore the operator can loose customers.
We show that when Pfixed(G) increases without exceeding
TABLE IV. OPTIMAL PARAMETERS VALUES OF DIFFERENT PRICING
SCHEMES.
Pricing scheme Optimal parameters values
FPP Pfixed(G) = 11 mu/PRB, Pfixed(S) = 6 mu/PRB,
Pfixed(B) = 4 mu/PRB
NLP b = 1, fc= 2 .6 mu, fg = 0.9 mu, fs = 0.7 mu, fb= 1 mu,
TH = 50%
SCP Pfixed(G)= 9 mu/PRB, THG = 20%, Pfixed(S) = 8
mu/PRB, K = 520, THS = THB=40%, Pfixed(B) = 4
mu/PRB
R2P Pfixed(G) = 9 mu/PRB,  = 5, THG = 20%, Pfixed(S)
= 6 mu/PRB, K = 110, THS = 25%, Pfixed(B) = 0.16
mu/(Kbit/s)
Fig. 1. Mean revenue versus Pfixed(G) when using R2P
Fig. 2. Mean number of users in the system versus Pfixed(G) when using
R2P
9 mu/PRB, the revenue from the Gold users increases as the
price charged increases. When Pfixed(G) exceeds 9 mu/PRB,
this revenue decreases because when the price to paid becomes
high, Gold users can cancel their connections.
When there are less Gold users in the system, connected
Silver users can increase as there are more available PRBs
and therefore the additional price for Silver users decreases.
Moreover, as the Bronze users are served in the latter, the
decrease of connected Gold users offers more free radio
resources to Bronze users to connect (see Figure 2). Therefore,
we observe that when Pfixed(G) increases, the revenue from
Silver and Bronze users increases.
Figure 3 represents the revenue from Gold, Silver, and
Bronze users as a function of Pfixed(S). Note that the revenue
from Gold users in constant as Gold users are served before
Silver users and the price paid by Gold users is independent
Fig. 3. Mean revenue versus Pfixed(S) when using R2P
Fig. 4. Mean revenue versus THs
of Pfixed(S). We show that the revenue from Silver users
increases then decreases. In fact, the operator revenue depends
on the increase of the price to pay and the increase of the
blocking rate of Silver users when Pfixed(S) increases.
Figure 4 represents the revenue from Gold, Silver, and
Bronze users as a function of THS . When THS increases,
the number of users that do not need to pay additional price
increases as congestion periods are delayed. However, the
operator does not take advantages from the additional price
specially for users having higher valuation. We note that when
THS increases without exceeding 25%, the revenue from
Silver users increases as the number of users that pay only
a fixed price increases. When THS exceeds 25%, the operator
cannot profit from Silver users that are able to pay higher
additional prices.
C. Pricing schemes comparison
We now compare between the different pricing schemes.
Figure 5 represents the users served ratio when using R2P,
SCP, NLP, and FPP. We note FPP almost serves the same
ratio for different kinds of users as this pricing scheme uses a
fixed price and does not specify any threshold for congestion
periods. We also observe that NLP provides the highest ratio of
Gold users served as it defines the same congestion threshold
for all users categories and favors the Gold users. Therefore,
as the radio resources are limited, this pricing scheme serves
a very low number of Bronze users.
Fig. 5. Users served ratio for different pricing schemes
Fig. 6. Bandwidth utilization ratio for different pricing schemes
We note that SCP serves the lowest number of Silver users.
In fact, the additional price for this kind of users categories
is very high, so many uses prefer to cancel the service
connection. As every users category has its own congestion
indication threshold, the low number of Silver users served
provides more free PRBs for Bronze users that take advantage
for low price before a congestion happens. Finally, we show
that our proposed pricing scheme gives preference to Gold
then Silver and finally Bronze users. Moreover, R2P serves
a total number of users near to that served by other pricing
schemes. Comparing to SCP and FPP, our pricing scheme does
not the highest users served ratio. However, the revenue does
not depend only on this performance factor. In fact, an operator
has to profit from the willingness-to-pay of users and as every
user has its valuation, FPP does not match with a realistic
environment. Moreover, a pricing scheme has to use the whole
bandwidth. In Figure 6, we show that SCP under-utilizes the
bandwidth as it defines a very high additional price. However,
we notice that our pricing scheme uses the whole bandwidth
and therefore users profit from the total of available bandwidth
in order to satisfy their QoS requirements.
Figure 7 represents the mean revenue from different users
categories. We note that R2P and SCP outperforms NLP and
FPP. In fact, these schemes define a congestion threshold for
each user category in order to increase the price to pay when
resources become scarce. We also note that R2P provides
the highest revenue. This is due to the radio resource under-
utilization and the very high additional price when using SCP.
Fig. 7. Operator revenue for different pricing schemes
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have evaluated our proposed pricing
scheme for different categories of LTE users: Gold, Silver,
and Bronze. We compare R2P to various pricing schemes
already proposed for LTE as SCP or adapted to this promising
technology as FPP and NLP. We show that R2P benefits
from the diversity of services and user willingness-to-pay and
provides the highest revenue. Moreover, this pricing scheme
takes into account the congestion periods and does not totally
block users before profiting from the whole bandwidth.
As a part of our future work, we will study the sensitivity
[16] of our pricing scheme in order to verify if it still provides
the highest revenue even if the operator cannot select the
optimal parameters values. We will try to combine this pricing
scheme with a sophisticated scheduling algorithm [17] for
the 4G LTE-advanced networks using carrier aggregation to
improve operator charging.
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